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Universities have long struggled to deﬁne their relation to the business
world (Geiger 2004). How much should professors be involved in commer-
cial activities? How much inﬂuence should ﬁrms have on university poli-
cies? How much should universities themselves be run like for-proﬁt busi-
nesses? Today, much of the U.S. science and engineering workforce is
trained at institutions where professional start-up companies are the norm
and where much corporate research has been outsourced to academic
groups. This situation diﬀers markedly from that of the period between
1945 and about 1970, when federal funding for basic research was so large
that academics did not need to rely on corporate support, and companies
like IBM and AT&T could run big laboratories doing high-quality basic re-
search (Mirowski and Sent 2007).
As with any trend in higher education, emotions run high in discus-
sions of university-industry relations. Critics see “academic capitalism”
(Slaughter and Leslie 1997) as leading to the exploitation of students, the
neglect of teaching, and the distortion of scientiﬁc knowledge to meet
commercial patrons’ needs (Bok 2003; Kirp 2003). Proponents see it as en-
ticing professors out of their ivory tower and making universities more re-
sponsive to changing public (and market) demands (Etzkowitz 2002). Pro-
ponents call for more direct incentives for professors to commercialize
their discoveries; critics call for a return to a (probably nonexistent) golden
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terms of its commercial applications.1
Most of these arguments are couched in very abstract terms. Where we
do have detailed, empirical studies of academic capitalism, they have
tended to be broad surveys or examinations of a small selection of regions
and universities, especially Stanford, MIT, Silicon Valley, and Route 128
(Vettel 2006; Lécuyer 2006; Kenney 2000). These studies reveal much, but
they neglect key aspects of the way science is actually conducted. Most re-
searchers participate in networks that are geographically dispersed and
that include colleagues in both academia and industry and from a variety
of disciplines. To understand the commercialization of academic knowl-
edge, we need a multiinstitutional, multidisciplinary, multiregional unit of
analysis—what I will call an “instrumental community.” By this I mean the
porous group of people commonly oriented to building, developing, using,
selling, and popularizing a particular technology of measurement.2 Such
communities are instrumental primarily in focusing on new research
tools—microscopes (Rasmussen 1997), fruit ﬂies (Kohler 1994), tobacco
mosaic virus (Creager 2002), lab rats (Rader 2004), ultracentrifuges (Elzen
1986), and so forth. Because such communities usually include academic
and commercial participants, though, they will often seek ways to morph
those tools into industrially-relevant devices. Thus, such communities are
also instrumental in focusing on new ways of doing or making things.
There are a number of excellent case studies of various instrumental
communities, spanning from the seventeenth century to the 1960s (Shapin
and Schaﬀer 1985; Jackson 2000; Pantalony 2004; Bromberg 1991; Lenoir
and Lécuyer 1995). Yet there have been virtually no studies of instrumen-
tal communities that have arisen since the late 1970s. We know that there
have been signiﬁcant changes in legislation, federal funding, corporate re-
search, and the demographics of science in the past three decades. We do
not know how those changes have aﬀected the operation of instrumental
communities, nor how they have aﬀected relationships between corporate
and academic members of those communities. This chapter aims to bring
these issues to the fore through a case study of the development and com-
mercialization of the scanning tunneling microscope (STM) and its near-
relatives, the atomic force microscope (AFM) and magnetic force micro-
scope (MFM)—known collectively as probe microscopes.3 In 1981, there
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1. Shapin (2003) casts doubt on the assumptions underlying both these positions.
2. An “instrumental community” bears a close resemblance to the “innovation communi-
ties” analyzed by Shah (2003). “Instrumental community” is—so far as I know—my own
formulation, but others have covered very similar ground, especially Blume (1992) and Shinn
(1997).
3. The technical details of the microscopes are important to this story, but can be glossed
for the purposes of this chapter. Basically, all scanning probe microscopes bring a small, solid
probe very close (usually to within a nanometer—one billionth of a meter) to a sample and
measure the strength of diﬀerent kinds of interactions between probe and sample to deter-was only one, homemade, unreliable STM at the IBM research lab in
Zurich. Today, through the joint eﬀorts of corporate and academic re-
searchers, there are thousands of AFMs, MFMs, and STMs at universities,
national labs, and industrial research and quality control facilities. High
school students make STMs from Legos, while chip manufacturers use
million-dollar AFMs on the factory ﬂoor. One AFM has even made it to
the surface of Mars.
Using the instrumental community as a unit of analysis allows us to ap-
proach the same issues that motivate the other chapters in this volume, but
from a diﬀerent perspective and with a diﬀerent methodology. Looking at
the dynamics of an instrumental community can help us understand sev-
eral things: some reasons why professors commercialize their research;
some ways the training of graduate students and postdocs is linked to the
needs of companies their supervisors are associated with (Davis, chapter’s,
this volume); ways to interpret regions’ rates of retention of their science
and engineering graduates (Sumell, Stephan, and Adams, chapter 8, this
volume); and ways gender and ethnic diversity can make for more robust
(and commercial) knowledge (Whittington, chapter 6, this volume).
Unfortunately, an instrumental community is a nebulous, intangible, un-
stable grouping that would be very diﬃcult to study via the methodologies
of the other chapters in this volume. Surveys of scientists and engineers, for
instance, work well when there are institutions that map closely to the
group being surveyed: universities oﬀer an infrastructure for surveying re-
cent Ph.D.s.; professional societies (and their journals) oﬀer an infrastruc-
ture for surveying members of speciﬁc disciplines; funding agencies oﬀer
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mine the height (and other characteristics) of the sample. The probe is then rastered much like
the pixels on a TV screen and a matrix of values for the strength of the tip-sample interaction
is converted into a visual “picture” of the surface. Diﬀerent probe microscopes use diﬀerent
kinds of tip-sample interactions to generate their images. The earliest probe microscope, the
STM, works by putting a voltage diﬀerence between the tip and a metal or semiconductor
sample; when the tip is brought close to the sample, some electrons will quantum mechani-
cally “tunnel” between them. The number of electrons that do so (the “tunnel current”) is ex-
ponentially dependent on the distance between tip and sample; also, the stream of tunneling
electrons is very narrow. Thus, an STM has ultrahigh resolution both vertically and later-
ally—most STMs can actually see individual atoms on many samples. Today, the STM’s
younger cousin, the atomic force microscope, is more commonly used. An AFM uses a very
small but ﬂexible cantilever as a probe. As the tip of the cantilever (usually weighted with a
small pyramid of extra atoms) is brought close to the surface, the cantilever bends due to the
attraction or repulsion of interatomic forces between tip and sample. The degree of bending
is then a proxy for the height of the surface. Originally this bending was measured by putting
an STM on the back of the cantilever; today the deﬂection is detected by bouncing a laser oﬀ
the cantilever and measuring the movement of the reﬂected spot. Another common and
industrially-relevant tool, the magnetic force microscope, works in a similar way, but uses a
magnetic tip to map the strength of magnetic domains on a surface, rather than surface
height. Both the AFM and MFM have slightly less resolution than the STM (i.e., they can-
not usually see single atoms); yet because they (unlike the STM) can be used on insulators 
as well as conductors, and in air and ﬂuids as well as vacuum, they have become much more
popular.an infrastructure for surveying their grantees. Often, no institution maps
well to an instrumental community. Part (but only part) of the probe mi-
croscopy community was aﬃliated with a professional society—the Amer-
ican Vacuum Society—and probe microscopists tended to publish in many
diﬀerent journals and get funding from many diﬀerent sources. The closest
the community came to owning an institution were the annual (later bien-
nial) STM Conferences. Yet even these only drew part of the community
and, over the years, evolved into general nanotechnology conferences
rather than meetings devoted to a speciﬁc class of instrumentation.
I have opted to study (and partially deﬁne) the instrumental community
through extensive oral history interviewing. Interviews can be a problem-
atic methodology: people misremember or mislead, interviewers ask lead-
ing questions, important people can often spare little or no time for an in-
terview, one cannot interview everyone, or even know exactly who to talk
to. Still, interviews allow scientists and engineers to map out their relevant
communities for themselves, rather than having an institution do it for
them. That is, they can tell the interviewer who they were working with,
who they thought of as peers and competitors, with whom they were shar-
ing ideas, and so forth. By then interviewing thosepeople, the historian can
delineate the network of relationships that make up an instrumental com-
munity.
In the end, interview and survey data should be complementary. My in-
terviews, for instance, revealed some rather counterintuitive motivations
for people to found start-up companies. Unfortunately, interviews cannot
show how common such motivations are across the science and engineer-
ing community. Such motivations can, however, be folded into future sur-
vey questionnaires. Similarly, many of my interviews were informed by
quantitative data from other studies. For instance, many interviewees in
this study were people who were postdoctoral fellows when they ﬁrst built
or used a probe microscope. Those people could easily have been invisible
in my study had I not seen quantitative data on the evolving nature of the
postdoc as an institution of American science.
Letting the participants map out the boundaries of their instrumental
community allows us to see the wide variety of relationships linking nodes
in this network: student-teacher, buyer-seller, funder-grantee, supervisor-
postdoc, inventor-early adopter, editor-author, and so forth. Indeed, it is
the diversity of such linkages in the network that makes an instrumental
community robust. Instrumental communities are also made more robust
by the variety of the linkages connecting universities and corporations.
Both proponents and critics of academic capitalism in science tend to fo-
cus on a small subset of corporate-academic relationships: professorial
start-ups, patenting of academic research, and corporate sponsorship of
academic research.
This chapter will explore a much wider range of relationships, however.
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versa, technology transfer through ﬁrms’ hiring of former graduate stu-
dents and universities’ hiring of former corporate researchers, corporate
sponsorship of community-building activities such as conferences, corpo-
rate inﬂuence over researchers’ choices of materials to characterize with
their microscopes, corporate supply of parts for building microscopes (and
academic feedback to the design of those parts), and corporate sponsorship
of intramural research to stimulate formation of an extramural academic
market. Most of these kinds of relationships are invisible in the debate about
academic capitalism. Yet we shall see that other forms of commercialization
of academic research (e.g., professorial start-ups) actually have their roots
in these less-noticed dynamics of an instrumental community.
9.2 Inventing and Community-Building
Invention, though often praised in the abstract, can be problematic for
corporate scientists and engineers. Inventions can emerge from digressions
from assigned tasks, and may not meet any commercial objective. Corpo-
rate inventors often need to defy their managers to promote their innova-
tions. The STM was this kind of institutional orphan. Its inventors, Gerd
Binnig and Heini Rohrer, had been tasked in 1978 with ﬁnding new ways
to characterize thin ﬁlms for an advanced supercomputer project on which
IBM had staked much of its reputation. Yet by the time they came up with
the STM, the supercomputer project had been canceled (Binnig and
Rohrer 1985, 1987). Binnig and Rohrer’s response was threefold. First,
they temporarily hid the STM from managerial oversight. Second, they be-
gan querying IBM colleagues about new applications for their microscope,
eventually attracting interest from the company’s semiconductor surface
scientists.
Their third critical strategy was to cultivate an extramural, academic
community. By convincing colleagues at universities to replicate the in-
strument, they could point to extramural interest as a reason why their
managers should let them continue developing the STM. Indeed, the in-
terest in STM both inside and outside Big Blue convinced IBM’s senior re-
search managers that the STM—despite the absence of commercial rele-
vance—should become a major corporate project. Multiple groups of
scientists at the IBM laboratories in Zurich; Yorktown Heights, New York;
and San Jose, California were recruited to build STMs and make discover-
ies that would bring credit to the instrument and to the company. In turn,
IBM’s research archrival, Bell Labs, saw a need to steal Big Blue’s thunder
and began recruiting its own cadre of STMers.
The dynamics of building the STM community show how the corporate
and academic worlds are interpermeated much more than is noticed in de-
bates about academic capitalism. Binnig and Rohrer could quickly ﬁnd
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personnel exchange between IBM and various universities. Some repli-
cators were professors taking sabbaticals at IBM, some were academics
Rohrer had known from his own sabbaticals at universities, and some were
people who had been postdocs at IBM or currently had students serving
postdoctoral appointments there.4
Similarly, interest in the STM grew within IBM and Bell Labs not be-
cause it could solve commercially-relevant problems, but because it could
generate credible knowledge within academic disciplines such as physics
and surface science.5 Accolades from an academic audience—evidenced
by standing-room-only crowds at American Physical Society meetings, the
awarding of the Nobel Prize to Binnig and Rohrer in 1986, and the growth
of academic STM—were largely the aim of IBM’s STM program. Among
other things, prestige within a hot new instrumental community like tun-
neling microscopy allowed IBM to recruit the best graduate students as
postdocs and junior researchers. Some of those persons in turn built the
second and third generations of IBM’s tunneling microscopes.
9.3 Dynamics of Community
By 1986, the STM was no longer in any danger. An instrumental com-
munity was beginning to take shape, and was even beginning to organize
itself through an annual conference series. In the ﬁrst few years, those con-
ferences (and the community as a whole) was dominated by corporate
groups, especially from IBM and Bell Labs. Early academic STMers, such
as Paul Hansma at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB),
Calvin Quate at Stanford, and John Baldeschwieler at Caltech, were im-
portant contributors to the community. Yet these academics struggled to
compete with better-resourced corporate groups. The IBM and Bell Labs
STMers also had the advantage of proximity to other STM groups housed
in their same buildings. While there was often intense competition between
groups that were working for the same organization, their copresence did
allow the tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1962; Collins 1975) needed to build an
STM to ﬂow more quickly at IBM and Bell Labs than at more isolated lo-
cales such as Stanford and UCSB.
Bell Labs and IBM were both traditionally strong in computing and
microelectronics research. Their early dominance of the STM community
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4. The source material for this study is a collection of interviews with over 150 probe mi-
croscopists conducted between 2000 and 2004. I will reference speciﬁc oral histories using an
alphanumeric code listed in the appendix to this chapter. Information about the corporate-
academic network of sabbaticals and hires came from, among others, <TB1>, <JM1>, and
<PH1>.
5. There is rich historical material on the large, corporate labs of the twentieth century:
Wise (1985); Riordan and Hoddeson (1997); Bassett (2002); Knowles and Leslie (2001).meant, therefore, that early STMers largely used their microscopes to
study materials used in microelectronics manufacturing. In particular, Bin-
nig and Rohrer were most successful in enrolling colleagues interested in
the surface structure of metals and semiconductors. A few semiconductor
surfaces (especially of silicon) became yardsticks for measuring whether 
a group had a working STM or not—until a group’s STM had resolved
single atoms of silicon, its builders could not enter the top tier of STM
builders.6 Both corporate and academic STMers were evaluated in this
way. However, there was considerably more local knowledge about prepar-
ing silicon specimens at Bell Labs and IBM than in academic groups such
as Quate’s or Baldeschwieler’s.
Thus, the accreditation standards of the early STM community favored
corporate groups. Binnig and Rohrer, however, were keen to undo their
own company’s lead in STM research. Thus, they began looking for new
applications for the STM that would not interest IBM management, but
where academic researchers could move forward quickly. In Europe, for in-
stance, Binnig and Rohrer collaborated with academics to explore appli-
cations for the STM in electrochemistry and biophysics. In the United
States, Binnig visited Stanford for more than a year to help Quate’s group
think of new uses for the STM, while traveling around to help other groups
get their microscopes running. And Rohrer dispatched Binnig to Santa
Barbara (where Rohrer had taken a sabbatical several years earlier) to con-
vince Paul Hansma to adapt the STM to do vibrational spectroscopy of
molecules.
Soon, the American STM community began to segregate into two moi-
eties—surface science STMers, dominated by (but not exclusive to) corpo-
rate and national laboratories on the East Coast; and nonsurface scientists,
dominated by (but not exclusive to) universities on the West Coast.7 These
two moieties continued to share a great deal. Members of each occasionally
collaborated, and a few people moved from one to the other. More impor-
tantly, the basic design of the STM was—in the late 1980s—common to
both, so design innovations in one moiety could be transported to the other.
This meant that opportunities for copresence—conferences and visits and
sabbaticals between labs—continued to be useful for both moieties until the
early 1990s. Yet the two moieties did diﬀer markedly on some points of
STM design and use. In particular, surface science STMers built their mi-
croscopes for compatibility with ultrahigh vacuum (UHV) chambers, so as
to keep their metal and semiconductor samples pristine. These chambers
were, however, large, ﬁnicky, expensive, and time-consuming. Academics
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6. <JD2>, <PW2>.
7. Crucial corporate members of the latter, predominantly academic, moiety were Quate’s
allies within IBM: Dan Rugar, John Foster, and Tom Albrecht (former students who worked
at IBM Almaden); Kumar Wickramasinghe (a former postdoc, later at IBM Yorktown); and
Gerd Binnig (who took a sabbatical at Stanford from 1985 to 1986).like Quate and Hansma, who were less interested in studying pristine semi-
conductor samples, therefore developed easier, cheaper variants of STM
that did not require a vacuum chamber, such as doing tunneling microscopy
of samples exposed to open air, or immersed in water, oil, or a variety of
diﬀerent gases.8
Surface science STMers had a well-deﬁned set of questions to ask and
materials to study. By branching into new uses of STM, Quate, Hansma,
and Baldeschwieler freed themselves from the constraints of surface sci-
ence, but they also forfeited the structure that a discipline like surface sci-
ence can supply. They could better aﬀord to temporarily put aside dis-
cipline than the younger STMers in the corporate labs because Hansma,
and especially Quate and Baldeschwieler, were all tenured faculty with long 
track records of inventing instruments, getting grants, and winning acclaim
from their colleagues. The STM was, for them, a chance to start over,rather
than (as it was for the young corporate STMers) a chance to start oﬀ.
Still, by going down this road, they now had little idea what materials to
look at, what questions to ask, how to interpret their data, or what audi-
ences might be interested in their work. To answer those questions, they
encouraged their students to quickly build a wide variety of microscopes
and to playfully use them to characterize haphazard materials—leaves of
houseplants, polaroids, bone from ribeye steaks, ice, the electrochemistry
of Coke versus Pepsi, and so forth.9 This undisciplined, shoestring brico-
lage extended even into microscope-building: the Baldeschwieler group
made STM probes from pencil leads, for instance, while the Hansma group
made AFM tips from hand-crushed pawn shop diamonds, glued to tin foil
cantilevers with brushes made from their own eyebrow hairs.
Yet such indiscipline could damage STM’s acceptance by new discipli-
nary audiences, since the STMers’ ways of preparing samples and inter-
preting images might not be credible to biologists, electrochemists, materi-
als scientists, geologists, and so forth. Thus, Quate, Hansma, and other
academic STMers began bringing representatives (postdocs or young pro-
fessors) from potential new disciplinary audiences in to work with their
students, learn how to use the microscope, show the group how to prepare
samples, and then proselytize for the technique within their home commu-
nity. Quate tended to recruit postdocs himself and share them with other
Stanford faculty.
Hansma actively sought collaborations with young faculty both at
UCSB and elsewhere, but he was more haphazard about postdocs, taking
in people who brought their own money and expertise but not seeking
them out. Nevertheless, he had a long string of such visitors, since by the
late 1980s graduating Ph.D.s in molecular biology or electrochemistry
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8. <CP1>, <PH1>.
9. <CP1>, <JN1>.could see that if they learned to use STM or AFM they would be able to
understand their discipline’s canonical samples in a way that none of their
disciplinary colleagues would. At both Stanford and UCSB, some of these
people took a microscope with them when they left, some founded their
own microscope-building groups at other universities, and some used their
knowledge of probe microscopy as a tool for gaining acceptance among
disciplinary colleagues and securing tenure from their universities.10
Thus, the diﬀerences between the two moieties were as much about ped-
agogy and career arc as they were about samples, designs, and audience. In
groups such as Quate’s and Hansma’s, graduate students were trained to
build instruments quickly and collaboratively, to think primarily about
novel design rather than use. Postdocs in those groups, meanwhile, were
trained to develop new uses for the microscopes, and to integrate them into
various established disciplines—STM for biology, materials science, elec-
trochemistry, and so forth.
In the corporate labs, postdocs and young staﬀscientists also underwent
a kind of training. At the time, Bell Labs was considered one of the pre-
eminent research institutions in the world in a variety of ﬁelds, especially
solid state physical sciences. In a few areas, especially those relevant to the
STM such as surface science and semiconductor physics, IBM ran neck-
and-neck with Bell Labs. Thus, postdocs in these organizations had the op-
portunity to do exciting, cutting-edge work. But they also had to compete
hard to remain in that rareﬁed world. To do so, they needed to convince the
large numbers of senior managers and surface scientists/semiconductor
physicists within these organizations that they could contribute rigorous
knowledge to those disciplines. The young corporate STMers therefore
learned to build and use microscopes geared speciﬁcally to the questions
and materials of surface science. Indeed, the most helpful managers were
those who directed postdocs to see the disciplinary apparatus of surface
science as a way to deﬁne problem areas—a kind of functional equivalent
of the research/career plans that Davis (chapter 3, this volume) discusses.
After they had established themselves they could branch out somewhat,
but early on the young corporate STMers all built relatively similar micro-
scopes to look at the same handful of samples—though with enough vari-
ation to demonstrate their builders’ individual initiative, creativity, and ex-
perimental ingenuity.11
In other words, the instrumental community growing around the STM
included elements of pedagogy at all participating sites, rather than just in
the academic groups—the STM was a technology for turning young re-
searchers into full-ﬂedged scientists as much as a new technique for char-
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10. <AG1>, <HG1>, <JN1>. The propagation of a technique through the cascade of post-
docs and collaborators away from one of the centers of an instrumental community is de-
scribed in Kaiser (2005).
11. <BW2>.acterizing materials. Analysts of academic capitalism should keep this in
mind—universities have no monopoly on scientiﬁc training. Moreover, in
this particular case the pedagogical uses of the STM encouraged a wider
division of labor in the instrumental community. Because young corporate
STMers had such a monopoly on metal and semiconductor samples, grad-
uate students building STMs were instead encouraged to expand the in-
strument’s capabilities into new areas.
Critics of academic capitalism often complain that corporate inﬂuence
can restrict academic researchers’ focus too narrowly—that only those
lines of research that might be proﬁtable are pursued. In some cases, such
inﬂuence clearly can be detrimental to the conduct of science. In other
cases, such as the early STM community, corporate inﬂuence actually
prompted academic research to adopt a diversity of approaches and a
more expansive outlook.
9.4 Building and Buying
Until 1986, all probe microscopes (whether corporate or academic) were
home-built, in that they were put together by the groups that were using
them. Yet home-built instruments were not made entirely from scratch—
some components were made by hand, but most were bought from 
commercial suppliers. The STM designs were strongly shaped by the com-
mercial availability of components such as operational ampliﬁers, and
high-grade materials such as platinum-iridium alloy. In some cases, STM
builders simply ordered these items from catalogs. In other cases, they were
active consumers, lobbying companies to modify products (vacuum cham-
bers, piezoelectric crystals, video output devices, etc.) to suit their needs.12
Thus, STMers were both consumers and producers of equipment. This
is important to note because most proponents of academic capitalism fo-
cus solely on academics as producers of marketable knowledge and goods.
Their recommendations for achieving a more commercial university there-
fore center on stimulating professorial start-up companies. Yet universities
may ﬁnd that the best way to gain inﬂuence over an instrumental commu-
nity is by encouraging professors to be savvy, active consumers who can
trade their expertise for favorable deals from manufacturers.
In a number of indirect and often counterintuitive ways, commerce sup-
plied the infrastructure needed to make the STM community grow. Infor-
mation about commercial sources of reliable components and materials was
300 Cyrus C. M. Mody
12. <DF1>. Much recent history of technology has focused on the active role of users. For
consumers’ adaptations of artifacts for uses that manufacturers were unaware of, or even op-
posed, see Kline and Pinch (1996). For users’ pressure on companies (often—as in instru-
mental communities—through threats to form their own cooperatives or ﬁrms), see Fischer
(1992). For an overview of diﬀerent kinds of user activity, see the essays in Oudshoorn and
Pinch (2003).a major topic of gossip among early STM builders. Those who had built
working instruments oﬀered blueprints and recommended particular com-
mercial suppliers of components to new members of the community. Those
newcomers, anxious to make up for lost time, rarely questioned their
predecessors’ advice, so that STM-building came to resemble doing a proj-
ect from Popular Mechanics. STM-building became standardized through
STMers’ nearly ritualistic allegiance to recommended suppliers, even when
the technical rationale for their components disappeared. For instance,
IBM’s STMers used a trademarked rubber called Viton (from Dupont) to
dampen vibration, because Viton could survive ultrahigh vacuum.13 Later,
as IBM’s blueprints disseminated, Viton continued to be widely used even
in academic STMs that operated in air or ﬂuid, not vacuum.14
A commercial infrastructure also helped STMers standardize the mate-
rials they looked at with their microscopes. As Daniel Lee Kleinman (2003)
has noted, corporate inﬂuence over the choice of research materials is per-
vasive but indirect. Tapping into the right commercial infrastructure can
be crucial to growing an instrumental community. Reliable, cheap com-
mercial sources of materials give newcomers easy access to research, and
give the rest of the community a yardstick by which to measure newcom-
ers’ progress. Among corporate surface science STMers, this yardstick was
provided by a few key semiconductor samples. Newcomers had to prove
that their microscopes could resolve individual atoms of those canonical
semiconductor samples to gain entry to the instrumental community.
Atoms can (ordinarily) only be seen on semiconductor samples when
they are kept in ultrahigh vacuum. Thus, when academic STMers designed
microscopes for use in air and water, they could no longer use the canoni-
cal semiconductor surfaces as a standard of microscope-building ability.
Quate, Hansma, and others looked desperately for new yardstick materi-
als. Gold, paraﬃn, and graphite vied for the job, but graphite won out
partly because ultrapure samples could be obtained cheaply from com-
mercial sources.15 Union Carbide used graphite to make monochromators
for neutrons, an application requiring extraordinarily pure samples; hence,
they rejected large amounts of slightly imperfect graphite still pure enough
for STMers. The Quate group heard about this and alerted other academic
groups who then called Union Carbide’s graphite man, Arthur Moore, to
get cheap, more or less standardized samples. By 1989, the STM commu-
nity was awash in graphite, such that talks about that material outnum-
bered talks on semiconductors at the annual STM conferences.
Sometimes, the industrial relevance of materials was a direct inﬂuence
acting on academic microscopists, feeding back into the designs of their in-
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13. <CG1>, <RT1>, <VE1>.
14. For similar instances of practices spreading through an experimental community
through transmission of knowledge about particular brands, see Jordan and Lynch (1998).
15. <AG1>.struments. Cal Quate, for instance, framed his STM work within Stan-
ford’s long tradition of industrial ties and his own involvement in develop-
ing acoustic microscopy in the 1970s as a nondestructive characterization
tool for manufacturing.16Nondestructive testing held tremendous promise
for microelectronics, where chips must be inspected throughout the manu-
facturing process, yet where traditional testing tools (especially electron
microscopy) require breaking and discarding expensive silicon wafers.
Quate moved into STM believing it could be the next generation nonde-
structive evaluation tool for the microelectronics industry. He was then
able to inspire his former students and postdocs at microelectronics giants
such as IBM to follow his lead and join the STM community.17
The STM, though, requires a conducting (metal or semiconductor)
sample, whereas most microelectronic materials have an insulating oxide
layer. This was unproblematic for corporate surface scientists tasked with
generating basic knowledge about materials like silicon and gallium ar-
senide. Yet STM’s restriction to conducting materials blocked its use in
nondestructive testing or in industrial quality control more generally. So
when IBM allowed Gerd Binnig to take a sabbatical at Stanford from 1985
to 1986, he and Quate adapted the STM so it could use interatomic forces
to map insulating materials, calling their new invention the atomic force
microscope (AFM). Thus, Quate positioned his research much further
downstream in IBM’s R&D cycle than most of IBM’s own STMers and, to-
gether, IBM and Stanford dramatically shifted the world of academic and
corporate probe microscopy.
9.5 Commercialization and Gray Markets
What we have seen so far, then, are the more intricate, unglamorous ways
corporate and academic actors are linked within an instrumental commu-
nity: through pedagogy, through institutional politics, through commercial
infrastructures, and through tacit knowledge. These are not the relation-
ships that exercise most analysts of academic capitalism. Instead, both pro-
ponents and critics tend to focus on large corporate buy-ins to academic
departments, professors keeping research secret so they can patent it, and
corporations and universities colluding to suppress unfavorable results.
One topic central to the academic capitalism debate will occupy the rest
of this chapter—the commercialization of academic research and the
founding of professorial start-up companies. The commercialization pro-
cess was not sudden, dramatic, and proﬁt-driven, but built slowly and qui-
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16. <JF1>, <DR1>, <MK1>. “Nondestructive testing” means that the process of quality
control testing does not damage the item being tested. Products can be taken oﬀthe assembly
line while half-ﬁnished, inspected, then returned to the assembly line. See Quate (1985) for a
brief description of scanning acoustic microscopy at Stanford.
17. Quate’s optimism for STM derived from its ultrahigh resolution and the fact that (ide-
ally) the STM tip does not touch (and thereby mar) the sample surface.etly from the kinds of practices I have described thus far. Commercializa-
tion of probe microscopy was driven less by proﬁt-seeking and more by the
desire of elite STMers to grow a larger instrumental community in which
their groups would be centers of expertise. This desire was strong among
both corporate and academic groups, though the motivations diﬀered in
the two moieties. At IBM and (to a lesser extent) Bell Labs, research man-
agers wanted to increase the number of in-house STM groups, so as to keep
the center of the STM community within the corporation. Academics like
Quate and Hansma wanted to grow the STM (and AFM) community be-
cause they were looking for new applications and audiences, and because
they wanted to build a critical mass of researchers committed to nonsur-
face science probe microscopy.
Both Bell Labs and IBM built something like an internal free market for
tunneling microscopy, with multiple groups in diﬀerent parts of the organi-
zation given similar tasks and competing for the attention of senior man-
agers. Both companies also developed an infrastructure for STM research
that allowed new lab groups to get up to speed very quickly. For instance,
Bell Labs housed several (varying between two and four) STMs in an old
tractor shed on the edge of its property. There, microscope builders could
very quickly trade ideas, materials, blueprints, and software—very much in
the same way that Quate’s students worked on multiple microscopes at once
and cannibalized parts and design ideas from one project to another.18
IBM took the internal STM market/infrastructure to even greater
lengths. IBM had been ﬁrst into STM, yet it took other IBM groups just as
long—almost two years in some cases—as everyone else to replicate Bin-
nig and Rohrer’s microscope. Thus, senior management cast about for
ways to package the tacit knowledge of instrument-building and reduce
replication time. The preferred strategy was to make semistandardized,
batch-produced (Scranton 1997) STM packages available to its re-
searchers. The ﬁrst was the “Blue Box” designed by Othmar Marti, a Swiss
graduate student doing doctoral work at IBM Zurich.19 The Blue Box was
primarily an electronics package—researchers constructed the hardware
themselves, often using Binnig and Rohrer’s designs. The STM electronics
presented a signiﬁcant challenge; complicated feedback circuitry brings
the probe to the surface, reads out and controls the tunnel current, and
rasters the tip without crashing. The success of the Blue Box in allowing
newcomers to work around these diﬃculties inspired a more ambitious
eﬀort at IBM Yorktown. There, Joe Demuth, manager of an STM group,
assigned his postdocs to work with Yorktown’s Central Scientiﬁc Services
(CSS) shop to develop and batch-produce complete STMs to “sell” to
other Yorktowners.20
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18. <JG3>, <BS1>.
19. <OM1>, <JG1>.
20. <BH1>, <RT1>, <JD2>.By 1990, about a dozen of these CSS STM’s were in use at Yorktown and
the nearby Hawthorne facility; some also accompanied former IBM post-
docs when they left to become professors.21 Yorktown management en-
couraged use of the CSS STM by making its purchase a zero-cost budget
item for each research group. Still, groups had to invest labor—usually a
postdoc—to make the microscope productive. This confronted its postdoc
users with a dilemma. They needed to creatively solve technical problems
and display initiative to managers to advance to staﬀpositions. This meant
they needed to radically reconstruct the CSS STM to show oﬀ their skills.
Postdocs also found that the CSS STM pulled them into intense institu-
tional politics. Postdocs using the CSS STM found that competing York-
town groups viewed them as partisans of Demuth’s style of microscopy.
Thus, there was great institutional pressure on these postdocs to disavow
the CSS STM by rebuilding and transforming it.22 The culture of research
at Yorktown made it impossible to view the CSS microscope as a ready-to-
use black box (Latour and Woolgar 1986), and therefore precluded any
possibility of its commercialization outside IBM.
In contrast, commercialization was more successful from academic 
STM and AFM groups largely because of the outward-looking, multidisci-
plinary style they had cultivated in order to avoid competing with the sur-
face scientists at IBM and Bell Labs. People like Binnig, Rohrer, Quate, and
Hansma were extraordinarily open with newcomers, freely oﬀering blue-
prints and advice in order to build a critical mass of nonsurface science
probe microscopists. Thus, the circulation of materials and ideas—a kind
of “gray market”—became the norm in academic STM and AFM. Soft-
ware (to control probe and display images) was particularly easy to distrib-
ute, and the groups that gave it away both won goodwill within the instru-
mental community, and ensured access to modiﬁcations to the software that
their collaborators came up with.23 Sometimes code was given for free,
sometimes at nominal cost. Proﬁt was not the motive for dissemination.
A well-traveled hardwareinnovation was the microfabricated AFM can-
tilever. One perceived defect of early AFMs was that probes were labori-
ously handmade from small strips of aluminum foil with a tiny sliver of di-
amond glued on one side and a tiny shard of glass on the other.24Although
these cantilevers could yield exquisite AFM images, each required consid-
erable time and training to make, and results were so particular to one can-
tilever and its maker that images taken with diﬀerent cantilevers were diﬃ-




24. Diamonds were used as tips because their sharp points were less likely to wear down
from repeated use than other materials. The glass on the back of the cantilever acted as a small
mirror, bouncing laser light into a photodiode; the position of the reﬂected beam in the photo-
diode indicated how much the cantilever was bending (i.e., a proxy for how much the surface
was pulling or pushing on the diamond tip).cult to compare. Handmade cantilevers suﬃced early on, when every im-
age was new and spectacular. But as the technique matured, AFMers
sought standardization. The Quate group delivered this by integrating it-
self with microlithography expertise at Stanford and around Silicon Valley.
Over several years, Quate sent his students to other electrical engineering
professors at Stanford to learn the microelectronics industry’s techniques
for patterning and etching silicon. The students adapted those techniques
to make batches of small, standardized silicon cantilevers. By 1990, Quate
was sending surplus probes to friends and collaborators, sometimes so he
and his students could share authorship on those collaborators’ papers.
Quickly, Quate-type probes became essential to AFM research.25
Quate’s and Hansma’s multidisciplinary collaborations prepared the
ground for commercialization in other ways. These collaborators would
usually found their own STM or AFM groups at other universities and ef-
fectively advertise for the technique, building interest in probe microscopy
among biologists, electrochemists, mineralogists, and so forth. Eventually
interest from those disciplines would turn them into markets for commer-
cial STMs and AFMs. At the same time, Quate’s and Hansma’s graduate
students learned to deal with potential “customers” from other disciplines
and to design microscopes with their needs in mind. The leap from these
practices to outright commercialization was very small.
The ﬁrst to make this leap was a Quate student, Doug Smith, who
founded the Tunneling Microscope Company in 1986. Smith had only one
employee, a fellow student who helped put together scanners, and he
recruited customers by word of mouth. He viewed the company less as an
ongoing enterprise than as a way to sweeten the hardships of graduate
school—a well-circulated story is that he sold just enough microscopes to
buy a BMW before taking a postdoctoral fellowship. Quate himself pushed
Smith to separate scholarship and business more cleanly: “Dr. Quate said
‘graduate students work, eat, and sleep, and most of the time they go hun-
gry.’ You can’t have a company and be a graduate student at the same time,
so Doug had to ﬁnish up and move out.”26
On the demand side, Smith’s customers were in much the same position
as the postdocs at IBM who were presented with the CSS STM. They saw
a commercial STM as a way to quickly catch up and join a hot new instru-
mental community. Yet they knew that if they were to join the elite of that
community, they would have to demonstrate instrument-building virtuos-
ity on their own. Thus, like the batch-produced IBM instruments, Smith’s
commercial STMs were more starter kits than black-boxed devices. To use
the instrument, customers needed to construct much of it themselves.27All
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25. <TA1>, <MK1>, <BD2>.
26. <MK1>.
27. <JF1>, <NB1>, <RC1>.Smith sold was the microscope “head”—the piezoelectric scanner, tip,
base, and vibration-isolating stacks of Viton. Customers built the elec-
tronics themselves, customizing the microscope for their own applications.
Today, when customers buy an oﬀ-the-shelf AFM, they generally are
buying all of the expertise of microscope-building so that they will not have
to develop it themselves. Early on, that expertise was exactly what cus-
tomers of commercial STMs did not want to buy. Instead, they were pur-
chasing time, membership in an instrumental community, and a platform
on which to demonstrate their own instrument-building expertise. Con-
sumers wanted to be on an equal footing with producers, whether in a
commercial or academic setting.
9.6 Digital Instruments
Commercialization of the STM was accomplished through a series of
minute, unremarkable steps. Very little separated the home-built STM
(made with parts ordered from catalogs, often using blueprints given by
colleagues) from the STMs sold by Smith and (internally) IBM. The next
step was only slightly more dramatic—the founding of organizations ded-
icated wholly to manufacturing and selling probe microscopes. Critics and
proponents of academic capitalism both lay heavy emphasis on the found-
ing of start-ups. It is seen both as the best means to extract proﬁt from aca-
demic work, and as the ultimate distraction from the university’s pedagog-
ical mission. Yet both these views neglect the realities of how start-ups
operate within an instrumental community. Proﬁt is often the least visible
(and least successful) motivation for founding a start-up. Start-ups often
extend and enhance the pedagogical culture of an instrumental commu-
nity rather than despoiling it.
Digital Instruments (DI), the ﬁrst true start-up in the probe microscopy
community, was the brainchild of Virgil Elings, one of Paul Hansma’s col-
leagues in the physics department at UCSB. Elings’ ﬁrst contact with the
STM community, though, was Niko Garcia, a Spanish academic with close
ties to IBM, who came to give a lecture at UCSB. After talking with Gar-
cia and Hansma and attending the 1986 STM Conference in Spain, Elings
saw a market for an oﬀ-the-shelf STM and oﬀered to cofound a company
with Hansma. Hansma was even more wary than Quate of commerce en-
croaching on his lab’s activities, so he declined. However, he gave Elings the
same advice and schematics he made available to other STMers.28 With
this, Elings and his son built a prototype in their garage and entered it in 
a junior high science fair (where it took last place, since, as the judges
pointed out, “everybody knows you can’t see atoms”).29
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28. <PH1>, <VE1>.
29. <MT1>, <VE1>.For Elings, building the prototype was a chance to make sure the
Hansma design was commercializable, but also to test—and discard—
many axioms of STM-building that had accrued since 1981. Elings saw
STM-builders’ trade secrets as geared to instruments that were ﬁnicky and
diﬃcult to operate; and he saw possession of these trade secrets as limiting
the STM community to those deemed serious enough to build their own
microscopes. Elings wanted, eventually, to make STMs for nonbuilders
who demanded a simple to operate black box. Thus, he delighted in de-
bunking the STM-builders’ recipes by creating a more streamlined, easy to
use, more durable tool.
Elings wanted DI to be the ﬁrst to market a commercial microscope in
time for the annual STM Conference in 1987. His initial plan was to sell a
computer-controlled microscope (hence Digital Instruments). However,
by the time he brought in a former student, Gus Gurley, as cofounder, it
was too late for Gurley to write the necessary software in time. Instead,
Elings marketed the analog Nanoscope I as DI’s ﬁrst product. Probe mi-
croscopists from this era—both builders and buyers—remember their
ﬁrst acquaintance with the Nanoscope as a turning point. Now, for the
ﬁrst time, researchers could join the STM community without having to
build any part of their microscope. Moreover, unlike Smith’s clients, DI’s
customers did not need to have personal ties to the community. People
could (and did) simply call up Digital Instruments and order a micro-
scope.
Yet though it marked an important shift, the Nanoscope I still illustrates
the gradual, emergent character of commercialization. Like the CSS STM
and Doug Smith’s instrument, the Nanoscope I was more a kit than a full-
ﬂedged, black-boxed research tool. Indeed, Elings now calls this era at DI
the “toy business”—both for the Nanoscope I’s immature design, and for
its lack of serious applications.30 In following Hansma’s lead, Elings de-
signed an air STM, rather than the expensive, narrowly-focused ultrahigh
vacuum instruments used at IBM and Bell Labs. This made sense in open-
ing up a broad market, since few disciplines were willing to deal with or pay
for an ultrahigh vacuum chamber (which, in any case, ruined samples rel-
evant to almost everyone except surface scientists). Yet it was unclear in 
the 1980s what air STM could be used for, or what the images it produced
meant. Only in 1991 to 1992 did a consensus develop that air STM was
often not relying on tunneling for its contrast mechanism, and that many
well-publicized air STM images (particularly of DNA) were erroneous. As
a result, most air STMers abandoned the technique and followed Quate
and Hansma to AFM, usually by buying one of DI’s newly-available
Multimodes (capable of running an STM or AFM).
At this point, Elings had no sales force. He simply advertised in Physics
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30. <DC1>, <VE1>.Today (“$25,000 for atomic resolution”) and orders came in. Instruments
were FedExed to buyers, who put them together and got the microscope
running on their own. Despite this minimal marketing and customer ser-
vice (and limited product utility), the toy business was successful. An ad-
vertisement from 1990 estimates that in the ﬁrst three years, DI sold more
than 300 Nanoscopes at $25,000 to $35,000 each.31 The probe microscopy
community expanded quickly, and the center of gravity shifted as well. As
more people bought instruments, AFM and air STM began to outweigh
ultrahigh vacuum STM, and the corporate labs became less dominant.
High demand created a waiting list for DI’s instruments, prompting a pol-
icy that researchers who wanted a microscope quickly could promise to
name DI’s founders or employees as coauthors on papers generated with
Digital’s products.
9.7 The Start-Up Era
The end of the toy business roughly corresponded to the end of DI’s mo-
nopoly on commercial probe microscopy. By 1990, there were several new
STM and AFM manufacturers whose products and strategies diﬀered con-
siderably. Some competed with Digital Instruments for the general-
purpose microscope market, some targeted speciﬁc disciplinary niches.
Some made easy to operate black boxes, some built “open architectures”
for researchers who wanted to tinker with and modify the device. Some
survived, others ﬂoundered. All were small companies, mostly founded out
of universities speciﬁcally to make probe microscopes, though a few
moved into microscopy from other product lines. No big ﬁrms made more
than desultory attempts to sell STMs or AFMs—though a few (Hitachi,
IBM, Perkin Elmer) started down that road.
These start-ups were founded for a very diverse set of reasons. Most de-
bates about academic capitalism simply assume that, under the right set of
incentives, professorial start-ups are inevitable; for good or ill, the induce-
ments for professors to commercialize their work will be irresistible.
Maybe so, but this assumption looks less reliable when the contingent and
often counterintuitive reasons why people found start-ups are examined.
Digital Instruments provides a striking example. Digital Instruments and
Elings thrived at UCSB’s disreputable margins. When he arrived in the late
1960s as a brash, confrontational professor, it was hoped Elings would
build UCSB’s reputation in high energy physics. His swagger, though, led
to conﬂict with his department, which sidelined him into running its lucra-
tive but unloved Master’s of Scientiﬁc Instrumentation program.32 Un-
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31. From FASEB Journal, v. 4, n. 13 (1990), p. 1.
32. <JW1>.cowed, Elings transformed the master’s program into his personal empire
and a source for patents and start-up companies.
In the master’s program, students from many educational backgrounds
(biologists, engineers, even psychology majors) learned to build all kinds
of measurement technologies—not just research instruments but also me-
ters and tools for industry. Elings developed a pedagogical method that
prized tacit over formal knowledge, participation over instruction. Instead
of using textbooks and lectures, he simply connected students with profes-
sors on campus who needed instruments built and let them learn by doing.
Because student projects were based on ﬁnding solutions to real problems
faced by local researchers, they often yielded technologies Elings could
market to those researchers’ subdisciplines. Students learned to under-
stand customers’ needs and design technologies to answer them. This
made former master’s students the most important source of early em-
ployees for Digital Instruments.
So UCSB did, in a way, encourage creation of DI, though no school
would replicate their path. By sidelining a brilliant but diﬃcult professor
to the poorly-regarded master’s program, they encouraged him to reject
campus culture, denigrate academically-instilled formal knowledge, and
be receptive to the commercial possibilities of the tacit knowledge his stu-
dents accrued. Moreover, in making clear that Elings’ commercial ven-
tures hindered his academic career, the UCSB physicists made it more
likely that Digital Instruments would be his bridge to leaving academia.
Tension between Elings and UCSB even smoothed technology transfer
from Hansma to DI, since Elings’ hostility toward academic researchers
meant he rejected Hansma’s designs until they had been engineered to look
more like commercial products than most home-built instruments.
Disgruntlement of a diﬀerent kind motivated the engineers who worked
for DI and its competitors. Several of the early STM and AFM manufac-
turers were founded in the heart of the West Coast military-industrial
complex. Graduate students who had grown accustomed to the pictur-
esque surroundings and lifestyle of southern California often sought em-
ployment nearby, usually with defense ﬁrms like Lockheed and Hughes.
Yet defense work galled many of these engineers, driving them to probe mi-
croscopy. Much of Elings’ early workforce came to DI for this reason; and
in Los Angeles Paul West, one of John Baldeschwieler’s former postdocs at
Caltech, grew so frustrated with defense work that he started his own probe
microscopy company, Quanscan. As the West Coast start-ups matured,
they took on large numbers of students from their aﬃliated academic
groups as collaborators or summer employees. As Sumell, Stephan, and
Adams (chapter 8, this volume) point out, that kind of corporate experi-
ence during graduate school can be a strong inducement to stay in-region.
And, in fact, by the early 1990s Quate, Hansma, and Baldeschwieler grad-
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tively) PSI, DI, or Topometrix, or to join new STM and AFM start-ups
founded by engineers who had left those companies.33
The STM and AFM start-ups positioned themselves relative to each
other in ways that mirrored the relationships between the academic groups
with which they were associated. Digital Instruments may not have been
oﬃcially aﬃliated with the Hansma group at ﬁrst (indeed, even at the best
of times, there was always some suspicion between the two groups)—and
Elings was certainly proud of the ways the Nanoscope diﬀered from
Hansma’s microscopes—but DI’s products bore an obvious genealogical
kinship with Hansma’s STMs and AFMs, and DI drew on Hansma’s reputa-
tion in the community. In return, Hansma’s design innovations spread much
farther and faster than those of professors not aﬃliated with a start-up. 
Hansma’s peers in the probe microscopy elite noticed how DI helped
spread Hansma’s ideas and resolved to aﬃliate with their own microscope
manufacturers. Usually this meant helping former students and postdocs
found start-ups. For instance, two Stanford postdocs, Sung-Il Park and
Sang-Il Park (no relations) started Park Scientiﬁc Instruments (PSI) in
1989 with Quate’s assistance and quickly became the major employer of
Quate group veterans. Park Scientiﬁc Instruments’ designs traveled much
more directly from Stanford than DI’s designs did from UCSB. Moreover,
the research on new AFM applications conducted at Park Scientiﬁc often
picked up just where Quate’s own research left oﬀ.34 Commercialization
was the continuation of academic science by other means.
Similarly, just as John Baldeschwieler’s group at Caltech always lagged
behind Quate’s and Hansma’s in popularizing its discoveries and innova-
tions, the company he helped Paul West found, Quanscan, lagged behind
DI and Park Scientiﬁc in marketing commercialized versions of the Caltech
designs. But not all probe microscope companies were founded as proxies
for the competition between academic groups in an instrumental commu-
nity. Some were started to extend academic collaborations. For instance,
Stuart Lindsay, a physics professor at Arizona State University, had been an
early collaborator of Hansma’s, helping to adapt the STM for electrochem-
istry and biophysics. Once Hansma’s designs were commercialized by DI,
Lindsay pressed Elings to adapt the Nanoscope for Lindsay’s colleagues 
in electrochemistry and biophysics—to no avail, since Elings was usually
hostile to adapting the Nanoscope for anyone (DI had a strict no-custom-
instruments policy), especially when the suggestion came from outside the
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33. That is, by the late 1990s one could see a probe microscopy cluster forming, primarily
around Santa Barbara and Los Angeles, with start-ups like Paciﬁc Nanotechnology, Quesant,
Asylum Research, and Nanodevices founded by veterans from DI and Topometrix. Engi-
neers who left Park Scientiﬁc tended to drift into established Silicon Valley ﬁrms such as
KLA-Tencor.
34. <DB3>, <FG1>, <JN1>.company. So Lindsay founded his own company, Molecular Imaging, to
make attachments to the Nanoscope that would make it more compatible
with electrochemistry and biophysics—attachments that DI grudgingly
distributed for a few years until it developed its own competing line.35
Lindsay’s other motivations for founding a start-up say a great deal
about how commercialization and pedagogy ﬁt together in instrumental
communities. Long before Molecular Imaging, his group—like Hansma’s
at UCSB—had become a center for distributing blueprints and (espe-
cially) software to new STM builders. One of Lindsay’s technicians, Uwe
Knipping, developed one of the ﬁrst and most sophisticated computer-
controlled microscopes. Knipping’s software formed the basis for Lind-
say’s academic network-building, but it also caught the eye of two local en-
trepreneurs, Larry and Darryl McCormick, who founded a company,
Angstrom Technology, to commercialize it.36
As it turned out, Knipping’s architecture was far too sophisticated for a
commercial instrument, and the enterprise failed. But Lindsay had gotten
a taste for how network-building in the academic domain might be en-
hanced by commercialization. So a few years later when he encountered a
former postdoc of his who was having trouble ﬁnding work, Lindsay de-
cided to put the former postdoc in charge of starting a new company—
Molecular Imaging—as an extension of Lindsay’s research at Arizona
State University (ASU).37 This is probably the classic—if woefully under-
studied—story of commercialization: a professor’s technicians and gradu-
ate students make a widget, then the professor’s colleagues call up asking
for their own widget (or blueprints thereof), a student starts making
batches of widgets in their garage, and eventually, whether to help position
the professor within that instrumental community or to give lab personnel
needed work, the widget-making is spun oﬀ into its own organization.
In only a few cases were probe microscope start-ups inspired primarily
by proﬁt. Paul West’s Quanscan, for instance, always had the most venture
capital, the most MBAs, and the slickest advertising. Yet West’s own mo-
tivation was more personal than commercial: he saw entrepreneurship as
an intellectual challenge and a path to personal growth.38 Even so, Quan-
scan was actually at a disadvantage relative to competitors because it was
run more like a for-proﬁt business. The venture capitalists continually in-
terfered in operations, the MBAs had trouble understanding the values of
an instrumental community that they had never participated in, and the
advertising alienated many potential customers.
In contrast, Park Scientiﬁc, like DI, was a more rough-hewn aﬀair.
Sung-Il Park’s barber was hired as the oﬃce manager, for instance, and the




38. <PW2>, <JB1>, <GA1>.senior executives were Quate students with no business training.39 Indeed,
the Parks carved a market niche by letting it be known they were more in-
terested in technically sweet innovations than in mundane moneymaking.
As “gentleman scientists,” they could speak as peers with other researchers
and capture customers’ trust. Park Scientiﬁc gained a reputation for mak-
ing builders’ instruments—well-crafted, reliable, with enough idiosyncra-
cies and innards showing to be reminiscent of a microscope made by a
graduate student. Park was even willing to work with individual customers
to build a microscope for a speciﬁc application (something DI never did)—
if the engineering required a certain ﬁnesse. Through most of the 1990s this
strategy kept PSI running near DI, but Digital ultimately won out because
of its skeptical (sometimes hostile) attitude toward the expertise of its cus-
tomers. Where Park Scientiﬁc was willing to relive its Quate group origins
by respecting the knowledge of foreign disciplines, DI made one type of
microscope for everyone, and hid the workings of that instrument com-
pletely from customers’ view. This attitude allowed DI to break into the in-
dustrial market, where it could sell many more, and more expensive, mi-
croscopes to companies that usually wanted low-level technicians to learn
how to use the instrument in a day or two—market conditions for which
PSI was wholly unprepared.
As much as DI eventually prospered by distancing itself from Hansma’s
academic model, though, the company’s success hinged equally on contin-
ual sharing of culture, people, and inventions between start-up and aca-
demic lab. Both Elings and Hansma saw tacit, rather than formal, knowl-
edge as primary in instrument-building—Elings because of his work in the
instrumentation master’s program, Hansma because the contours of the
STM community had pushed him to encourage multidisciplinary collabo-
rations and undisciplined instrument-building. This shared emphasis on
the tacit meant both men took in people with diverse and unusual educa-
tional backgrounds: junior high students, river guides, undergraduates,
yoga instructors, retirees, psychology majors, and historians.40 This diver-
sity was almost unthinkable at other centers of probe microscopy such as
IBM or Bell Labs.
Age and gender diversity followed along with diversity in educational
background. There were, to be sure, a few women and young (i.e., college-
educated but no Ph.D.) people in the corporate labs, but they tended to exit
to academia somewhat more quickly than their male colleagues (women
usually to run their own academic groups, college graduates to go get
Ph.D.s). In the Hansma group and DI, very young people did much of the
daily work, while women and older people were often the source of crucial
innovations. A retired teacher named Sam Alexander, for instance, to whom
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40. <HH1>, <JM3>, <DB2>, <MT1>, <BD2>, <PH1>.Hansma had donated part of his laboratory, came up with the optical de-
tection scheme that is now the basis of DI’s AFMs. And Helen Hansma,
Paul’s ﬁrst wife, used her Ph.D. in biochemistry to transition Paul’s group
into biophysics at the same time that she transitioned back into lab work af-
ter many years of rearing children and teaching in the Santa Barbara school
system.41
As members of DI and the Hansma group became aware of parallels be-
tween their organizational styles, they appropriated these similarities to
accelerate the two-way ﬂow of people, materials, designs, and knowledge.
After the initial phase (when most DI employees were Elings’ former mas-
ter’s students), several Hansma graduates, postdocs, and collaborators
took high-ranking jobs at DI. Individuals on both sides collaborated to
transform Hansma’s research into commercial products; for instance, the
Hansma AFM (on which DI’s fortunes eventually rested) was turned into
a product through negotiations between Barney Drake (Hansma’s techni-
cian) and James Massie (a former Elings student) over which elements of
the Hansma design were indispensable and which were too ﬁnicky for any-
one but the graduate students who built them.42
Hansma also, for the ﬁrst time in his career and at Elings’ behest, began
patenting his research.43 As DI’s sales increased, the Hansma group kept
its place at the forefront of the AFM community through its steady supply
of DI instruments and the ability of Hansma’s students and postdocs to go
up the road to DI to scavenge parts and advice.44 That is, whatever his ini-
tial reservations about commercialization, Hansma came to see the part-
nership with DI as a way to position himself—intellectually and socially—
within his instrumental community.
In turn, once the toy business ended in the early 1990s, Elings began to
imitate Hansma’s tactic of bringing in collaborators from various disci-
plines. Digital Instruments built its own group of researchers from bio-
physics, magnetics, and polymer chemistry, who (like Hansma’s postdocs)
worked with instrument-builders, developed and published on new STM
and AFM applications, and traveled to give talks and attend conferences
to spread word about the technique.45Though DI was a proﬁt-making ven-
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41. That is, Paul Hansma’s lab, and DI, upended the whole notion of an educational mis-
match (Bender and Heywood, chapter 7, this volume). For Hansma and Elings, AFM-building
was not a static process for which any educational background could be mismatched. Rather,
diverse educational backgrounds oﬀered an engine for pushing AFM-building in new, unex-
pected directions.
42. <BD2>, <JM3>.
43. Quate, Hansma, Lindsay, Binnig, and the other more outward-looking probe micros-
copists all patented their work, especially after 1986. Many of those patents were probably
overlapping and diﬃcult to defend. The point of the patents, though, was initially to tie the aca-
demic group to the company with which it was most closely aﬃliated. Later on, patents were
used more to raise the stakes for other academic groups and start-ups to join this elite club.
44. <JH1>.
45. <SM2>, <MA1>.ture, its success arose partly from academic activities: doing basic research,
publishing articles, training and “graduating” employees, giving talks.
These practices were then widely emulated by the other start-ups.
9.8 Conclusion
So what does probe microscopy tell us about commercialization of aca-
demic knowledge and the value of corporate-academic linkages? First, the
development of probe microscopy shows how thoroughly—yet intricately
and indirectly—the corporate and academic worlds are connected. The lo-
cus of academic research is much wider than the university campus, just as
the locus of commerce is wider than the for-proﬁt business. Instrumental
communities are distributed across academic and corporate institutions.
Commercialization—the transformation of academic research into com-
merce—is not a simple pipeline from university to ﬁrm. Commercializa-
tion can play many roles within an instrumental community, and academic
research can be traded for many things other than money. Attempts, there-
fore, to directly stimulate and accelerate the transformation of academic
research into cash may well backﬁre. As we have seen, it was the looser, in-
direct ties between corporate and academic groups that fostered the
growth of STM and AFM and encouraged start-ups to emerge from uni-
versities, rather than direct pressure from corporations or overt incentives
from governments and universities.
Thus, proponents of academic entrepreneurialism should be wary of fo-
cusing too narrowly on increased proﬁt as the fruit of a commercialized
university. As we have seen, trading goes on all the time in instrumental
communities. The token of exchange is usually a mix of knowledge, pres-
tige, personnel, time, materials, money, opportunity, and so forth. The
popularity of various forms of barter changes as the instrumental commu-
nity changes. Commercialization can restrict some exchanges and make
money-based trades more prevalent. Few instrumental communities,
though, reach the point where their products can be sold for money. Even
within the probe microscopy community, only the atomic force microscope
and the magnetic force microscope have been commercial successes. The
STM, which provided the ﬁrst product for microscope manufacturers, was
eﬀective in training engineers to build microscopes, but never found in-
dustrial application. University administrators who hope that stimulating
professors to turn a gray market into a proﬁt-making start-up will bring
real patent revenue to their school will almost always be disappointed.
Moreover, development of an entrepreneurial instrumental community
may require that its members be drafted from less proﬁtable ﬁelds where
commercialization did not occur. The STM and AFM community, for
instance, initially drew on its members’ expertise in low-energy electron
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copy—instrumental communities with poor records of commercializa-
tion. Later, STM and AFM pulled in participants from many ﬁelds (surface
science, biophysics, mineralogy, electrochemistry, polymer science—some
more commercialized than others) who aided groups like Quate’s and
Hansma’s in their gray market activities. Instrumental communities and
disciplines that are not conducive to proﬁt-making nevertheless provide
the infrastructure and knowledge/labor pool for communities in which
proﬁt may be enormous. Policymakers should not think they can predict
which will be which; nor are they likely to succeed if they encourage only
the one at the expense of the other. Policymakers may be best advised to en-
courage professors to foster gray markets within their instrumental com-
munities—whether as consumers, producers, or both. Gray market activi-
ties of trading research materials, people, and components of technologies
enlarge the outlook of academic research and allow academic scientists to
be inﬂuential even when they are not proﬁtable.
Finally, both opponents and supporters of corporate involvement in
university life have seized on grains of truth. Supporters have it right that
corporate-academic linkages are desirable, even necessary, for research
and innovation. There was no golden age when faculty operated indepen-
dent of ﬁrms, pursuing disinterested research. Knowledge production in
physics, engineering, and chemistry was always aided by faculty consulting
and trading of personnel and ideas. The oft-criticized commercialism of
the “biotech revolution” merely extended long-standing entrepreneurial
practices into molecular biology. The STM and AFM case does, however,
give reason for opposing the notion that universities should be run as busi-
nesses, squeezing proﬁt where they can and operating along the rational
lines of modern management. The probe microscopy community devel-
oped rapidly because participants could point to diﬀerent institutional
poles—corporations, universities, national labs. At times, innovation oc-
curred because these poles were opposed—as when Hansma and Quate
shifted from surface science and UHV STM to new designs and applica-
tions. At other times, innovation occurred because participants strung out
hybrid forms between these poles—the gray market of software trading,
the CSS STM, and the toy business. Instrumental communities rely on a
variety of actors contained in diﬀerent kinds of institutions. If all these in-
stitutions are run on the same highly-managed, proﬁt-driven model, then
the movement of people and ideas—and the production of new technol-
ogies—will likely be hindered.
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Interviewees listed by alphanumeric, name, positions held over the period
covered by the interview, and date of the interview. All interviews con-
ducted by the author.
AG1: Andy Gewirth: Hansma collaborator; University of Illinois; 6/26/01
BD2: Barney Drake: Hansma group technician; UCSB; 10/18/01
BH1: Bob Hamers: Yorktown researcher; University of Wisconsin; 5/9/01
BP1: Becky Pinto: Stanford; Park Scientiﬁc; KLA-Tencor; 2/3/04
BS1: Brian Swartzentruber: Bell Labs technician; University of Wisconsin;
Sandia National Laboratory; 1/10/03
BW2: Bob Wolkow: IBM Yorktown; Bell Labs; NRC Canada; 5/22/01
CG1: Christoph Gerber: IBM Zurich technician; 11/12/01
CP1: Craig Prater: Hansma graduate student; Digital Instruments engi-
neer; 3/19/01
DB1: Dawn Bonnell: Yorktown postdoc; University of Pennsylvania; 
2/26/01
DB2: Dan Bocek: UCSB undergraduate; DI engineer; Asylum Research;
3/23/01
DB3: David Braunstein: Stanford; Park Scientiﬁc; IBM San Jose; 4/3/01
DC1: Don Chernoﬀ: Sohio Research; Advanced Surface Microscopy; 
9/5/01
DF1: Dave Farrell: Burleigh Instruments; 5/29/01
DR1: Dan Rugar: Quate student; Almaden researcher; 3/14/01
FG1: Franz Giessibl: IBM Munich; Park Scientiﬁc; Uni Augsburg; 
11/16/01
GA1: Gary Aden: Topometrix executive; 3/12/01
HG1: Hermann Gaub: Ludwig-Maximilians Universität; 11/14/01
HH1: Helen Hansma: UCSB professor; 3/19/01
JA1: John Alexander: Angstrom Technology; Park Scientiﬁc; KLA-
Tencor; 10/15/01
JB1: John Baldeschwieler: Caltech; 3/28/01
JD2: Joe Demuth: Yorktown manager; 2/22/01
JF1: John Foster: Quate student; Almaden researcher; 10/19/01
JG1: Jim Gimzewski: IBM Zurich researcher; UCLA; 10/22/01
JG3: Joe Griﬃth: Bell Labs; 2/28/01
JH1: Jan Hoh: Hansma postdoc; Johns Hopkins; 6/10/02
JM1: John Mamin: UC Berkeley; IBM Almaden; 3/15/01
JM3: James Massie: Elings master’s student; DI engineer; 10/18/01
JN1: Jun Nogami: Quate postdoc; Michigan State; 6/28/01
JV1: John Villarrubia: Yorktown postdoc; National Institute of Standards
and Technology; 6/28/00
JW1: Jerome Wiedmann: Elings master’s student; DI employee; 10/18/01
316 Cyrus C. M. ModyMA1: Mike Allen: UC Davis; Digital Instruments; Biometrology; 10/12/01
MK1: Mike Kirk: Quate student; Park Scientiﬁc Instruments; KLA-
Tencor; 10/12/01
MS1: Miquel Salmeron: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; 3/9/01
MT1: Matt Thompson: Digital Instruments; 2/26/01
NB1: Nancy Burnham: Naval Research Lab postdoc; Worcester Polytech-
nic; 2/20/01
OM1: Othmar Marti: IBM Zurich student; Hansma postdoc; University
of Ulm; 11/16/01
PH1: Paul Hansma: UC San Barbara; 3/19/01
PW2: Paul West: Caltech; Quanscan; Topometrix; Thermomicroscopes; 
3/30/01
RC1: Rich Colton: Naval Research Lab; Baldeschwieler collaborator; 
6/27/02
RT1: Ruud Tromp: Yorktown researcher; 2/23/01
SG1: Scot Gould: Hansma student; DI employee; Claremont McKenna; 
3/27/01
SL1: Stuart Lindsay: Hansma collaborator; Arizona State; Molecular
Imaging; 1/6/03
SM2: Sergei Magonov: Digital Instruments; 3/21/01
TA1: Tom Albrecht: Quate student; Almaden researcher; 3/14/01
TB1: Thomas Berghaus: Uni Bochum; Omicron; 11/19/01
TJ1: Tianwei Jing: Arizona State; Molecular Imaging; 1/7/03
VE1: Virgil Elings: UC Santa Barbara; Digital Instruments; 3/20/01
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